Florida Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 4

Article 3

March 1965

The Heart of the Working Man--A Post Mortem
John Klein Wigginton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John Klein Wigginton, The Heart of the Working Man--A Post Mortem, 17 Fla. L. Rev. 543 (1965).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Wigginton: The Heart of the Working Man--A Post Mortem

THE HEART OF THE WORKING MAN
A POST MORTEM

-

JOHN KLEIN WIGGINTON

Workmen's compensation acts have become a part of contemporary society due to the belief that the persons who enjoy the products
of business should ultimately bear the cost of injuries or deaths incident to the manufacture, preparation, and distribution of those products. This principle is analogous to the way in which ordinary
depreciation expense is shifted to the consumer by virtue of the price
structure. The producer must anticipate wear and tear of every sort
in fixing the price of his product. If the cost is a predictable element
of operation, sound business judgment demands that it be included
as an element of the price. The cost of these predictable elements is
borne by the consuming public. It is argued convincingly that the
cost of the unavoidable human wreckage that is involved in production
is likewise shifted to the purchaser. The medium of insurance provides an easy method of providing for the cost of such injuries in
advance, the premiums being regarded as an item of production in
fixing prices.1
The workmen's compensation division of the Florida Industrial
Commission and the Florida courts have had a difficult time dealing
with the compensability of heart diseases under the workmen's
compensation act. This difficulty is in part engendered by the logical
assumption that heart disease, in most instances, is the result of
natural causes. 2 This assumption is based on the fact that one of
every two workmen dies or terminates his employment because of
cardiac disease.3 Heart disease is distinguished from the other compensable ailment areas under workmen's compensation because of the
assumption that the disease has natural rather than accidental causes.
In deciding a heart case, the court is confronted with these considera-

tions: heart disease is not an occupational disease; causal relation
between accident and attack is difficult to show; the term "unusual
exertion," a requisite to recovery, is ambiguous and difficult to apply
as a causal factor in heart cases; heart disease is a cumulative process,
the proclivity building up over a period of years. On top of this is
the pressing necessity to compensate work-produced cardiac ailments.
A man with a defective heart is severely limited in his choice of
productive economic activity.
B.A. 1960, Vanderbilt University; LL.B. 1963, University of Florida; Member
of Tallahassee, Florida, Bar and the American Bar Association.
1. MALONE & PLANT, CASES ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 64 (1963).
2.

36 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 368 (1963).

3. Ibid.
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This problem of compensating the heart affliction has to be approached via interpretation of the compensation act. Those who
wish to extend full coverage to heart cases espouse a liberal interpretation of the law. They argue for a requirement of less proof and
contend that discussing "over exertion" or "unusual exertion" is
complicated and perplexing and is an unnecessary requirement for
pure causation. Further, liberals contend that the judiciary should
4
not read into an humanitarian act any limitation not in the act.
Those equally learned in the law counter with the argument that
the effect of dispensing with the presumption of death due to natural
physiological causes will be to promote a greater burden and injustice upon the employer by making him a life insurer.5 Exponents
of this more conservative school of thought also maintain that insurance companies will place the additional cost on the employer, who
will in turn pass this cost to the consumer. If industry refuses to bear
the added cost of industrial insurance, the reaction might be to minimize that expense by refusing to employ individuals with known
cardiac deficiencies and terminating the employment of employees
6
who have suffered cardiac episodes at home or at work.
Heart disease is not included in the injury and disability compensation schedule set forth in Florida Statutes, section 440.15 (1963).
Consequently, the burden of setting the exact amount of compensation in the heart case rests upon the deputy commissioner who acts as
the hearing examiner. Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline7 is the
basic guide to the hearing officer when he is faced with the task of
providing compensation for nonschedule injuries. There, the Florida
Supreme Court stated that the workmen's compensation act was designed to ultimately pass the expense incident to the hazards of industry to the consumer. The court expressly stated that the act
afforded no relief for physical ailment not produced by industry.
Hence, if an ailment is not produced by industry it is not compensable
under the act. Since heart disease is assumed to be the cumulative
effect of natural causes, the heart claimant has a very real hurdle just
getting his case within the act.
FLORIDA'S ACCIDENT AND UNUSUAL EXERTION REQUIREMENT

In 1945, the Florida Supreme Court, for the first time, expressly
dealt with heart injury compensability in the case of Cleary Brothers
Construction Co. v. Nobles." The court denied recovery primarily on
4.
5.
6.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

7.
8.

154 Fla. 30, 16 So. 2d 342 (1944) (dictum).
156 Fla. 408, 23 So. 2d 525 (1945).
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the theory of "no accident." Claimant had not been subjected to any
unusual strain or overexertion uncommon to the type of work he was
accustomed to doing.
Deceased was a large muscular man whose job was unloading box
cars containing sacks of cement. He had a preexisting heart disease,
apparently unknown. While standing at the door of the boxcar he
toppled over dead. The doctor testified that this preexisting condition
had progressed to such a stage that death might have occurred normally at any time, regardless of the activity in which decedent was
engaged. The commission denied the claim, but the circuit court reversed and allowed compensation. The supreme court denied compensation by reversing the circuit court on the basis that the facts of
the case did not bring it within the rule of Davis v. Artley Construction Co.9 The rule in Davis stated that when an employee afflicted
with disease receives a personal injury under such circumstances that
he might have had compensation under the law, and the existing
disease is accelerated by the injury, resulting in disability or death
earlier than would otherwise have been the case, there may be an
award under the act. While there was competent medical testimony
in Cleary to the effect that the heat and exertion by the claimant had
accelerated his death, there were no circumstances such that he might
have had compensation under the law. In short, deceased had had
no compensable injury on which to predicate a claim for acceleration
of the heart ailment. The existing statute 0 required that the acceleration be the result of an "accident," which was defined as an
"unexpected or unusual event." The court found that there was no
such "accident" in this case. The case against recovery was fully
made out at this point, however, the court stated in dicta that it did
not appear that claimant had been subjected to any unusual strain or
overexertion. Thus, both the "accident" and the "unusual exertion"
doctrines were utilized in order to deny recovery to the heart claimant. This strict form of the "accident" theory was followed throughout the 1940's. As recently as 1951 the Florida Supreme Court denied
recovery by applying this doctrine.'
In 1952 the case of Gray v. Employers' Mutual Liability Insurance
Co.12 was before the Florida court. Reconsideration of the "accident"
problem was involved and the decision had a tremendous impact on
the heart cases, although a heart injury was not the subject of the
claim.
Claimant was employed as a waitress and part of her job was to
9. 154 Fla. 481, 18 So. 2d 255 (1944).
10. FLA. STAT. §440.02 (19) (1941).
11. LeViness v. Mauer, 53 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1951).
12. 64 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1952).
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cook waffles. The waffle batter was stored in a five-gallon container
and was kept in the bottom of the refrigerator. Ordinarily the container was lifted by the bus boy, but occasionally Mrs. Gray performed
this duty. In January, the claimant picked up the can and suffered
an injury to her arm. She reported the injury, but lost no time from
work. Later, in April, claimant again was obliged to pick up the
can, but felt a sharp pain in the same arm and was unable to hold
the can. She sought services of a doctor, had X rays made, underwent
treatment, and returned to work by the first of May. The deputy
commissioner denied compensation on the ground that there was no
"accident" (unusual or unexpected event) preceding the injury and
that the injury itself, by virtue of prior supreme court decisions,
could not constitute the accident.
This decision was affirmed at all levels until it reached the Florida
Supreme Court. The court reversed, holding the statement that "the
injury itself cannot suffice for, or constitute, the accident"' 3 was not
intended to require a showing of an unexpected cause of the injury
such as a slip, fall, or misstep. "[I]t was intended only to require the
claimant to make a showing of some event or circumstances connected
with his work to which his injury can be directly attributed, in accordance with the rule that the claimant is required to show that
the accident or injury happened not only in the course of claimant's
employment but arose out of it."14 The court declared that the test
has been sufficiently met if there is an unexpected result, even though
there was no unexpected cause such as a slip, fall, or misstep. In
Gray the claimant did receive an injury to her arm, which was an
unexpected result of attempting to lift the heavy five-gallon can.
Consequently, the injury was held, to be accidental and hence compensable. In short, the claimant need show only that some workconnected event directly attributed to the injury. An unexpected
result of a normal job procedure qualifies as an accident. The dissenters, upon rehearing, used this conclusion as their reason for dissent. They felt that such an important alteration in the meaning of
"unexpected or unusual event" should be made by the legislature.
The legislature expressly ratified the change in 1953 by redefining
the term "accident" to include an "unexpected or unusual ...result,
happening suddenly." 15
Today the law concerning "accident" and "unusual exertion" in
heart cases is controlled by the 1961 case of Victor Wine & Liquor
13. Id. at 651, citing Brooks-Scanlon, Inc. v. Lee, 44 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1950).
14. Id. at 651, citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 Fla. 210, 3 So. 2d 381
(1941).

(Italics by the court.)

15. Compare FLA.

STAT.

§440.02 (19) (1951) with FLA. STAT. §440.02(19) (1953).

(Emphasis added.)
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Inc. v. Beasley.16 This decision requires that the claimant, in order
to make out a causal relationship between his employment and his
heart injury, show some unusual strain or exertion.
The claimant was regularly employed to load and unload cases of
whiskey. He had previously suffered two nondisabling heart attacks.
The apparent precipitating cause of the attack was the rush and
strain of stacking cases at top speed. The claimant was pushed to unusual speed because he was trying to keep pace with two employees
who were propelling cases to him on a conveyor belt. After stacking
many heavy cases, claimant developed an acute pain in his chest and
was compelled to stop work. The doctor at the hospital diagnosed his
ailment as a coronary thrombosis. The full commission affirmed the
deputy commissioner's finding that the claimant's condition was
causally related to his employment.
Upon initial hearing the Florida Supreme Court held that the
claimant had suffered his heart attack while at his usual work, under
stress of accustomed physical exertions, and hence was not entitled
to an award. The court failed to find evidence that claimant was
subjected to overexertion uncommon to the kind of work he was
accustomed to or that claimant's heart attack was an accident (that
is, an unusual event or result) that arose out of and in the course of
employment. A very vigorous dissent pointed to the unusual "result"
amendment to statutory definition of "accident" and proclaimed that
the court should not substitute its own analysis of the evidence for
that of the deputy commissioner.
Upon rehearing the court receded from its original ruling, holding
that:

7

When disabling heart attacks are involved and where such
heart conditions are precipitated by work-connected exertion
affecting a pre-existing non-disabling heart disease, said injuries are compensable only if the employee was as the time
subject to ah unusual strain or over-exertion not routine

to the type of work he was accustomed to performing.
Thus, if there is competent substantial medical testimony,
consistent with logic and reason, that the strain and exertion
of a specifically identified effort, over and above the routine
of the job, combined with a pre-existing non-disabling heart
disease to produce death or disability sooner than it would
otherwise have occurred from the normal progression of the
disease, the employee has a right to some compensation.

16. 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1961).
17. Id. at 588-89. (Emphasis added.)
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The case was remanded to the deputy commissioner for further
investigation. Hence, today the "unusual exertion" doctrine requires
the claimant to show not only that his injury was an unexpected result
that occurred during the course of his employment, but that it was
produced as a result of an exertion in excess of the routine requirements or duties of the employee.
A strong minority on the court contends that the claimant should
be compensated if there is merely a causal relationship between job
and condition. This minority seems committed to the position that
both the accident and causation requirements for compensation are
met when an unusual or unexpected injury occurs during the course
of employment. This position can be supported by the statement of
the majority in the Victor Wine case to the effect that: 18
It is therefore settled beyond question in this state that an
internal failure [other than heart failure] ... brought about by
exertion in the performance of the regular or usual duties of
the employment, may be found to be an injury "by accident,"
without the necessity of showing that such injury was preceded by some . . . slip, fall or blow.
It would seem logical to assume that if a muscle strain or ruptured
disc is compensable without any showing of unusual exertion, then
heart failure should also be compensable. This is the position of the
minority in the Victor Wine case. The liberal view of compensability
thus espoused is most likely the product of the unexpressed view that
workmen's compensation should provide a form of social insurance
for all those unfortunate enough to be the victims of ill health or
injury that is in any way connected to their employment. The more
conventional view remains, however, that the law is designed to provide only for those whose misfortune is actually caused by the industry in which they earn their livelihood.
The majority of the court adheres to the more conservative view
of the role of workmen's compensation and thus is concerned with
establishing a causal relationship between job and injury. Although
committed to the policy that "accident" need not be construed literally
as requiring a slip, misstep, or fall in heart cases' 9 the majority draws
a distinction between such cases and those involving more conventional internal failures. In the conventional cases, the court seems
ready to assume that ruptured discs, muscle strains, et cetera are
unusual results and thus "accidents," and also that if they occur during even normal exertion they have been caused by the employment.
In heart cases, however, the difficulty in determining whether the
18.
19.

Id. at 588. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid.
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injury is an unusual result, as well as whether the exertion was a
causal factor has resulted in superimposing the "unusual exertion"
test as a requisite for compensation. The difficulty in establishing
causation is a result of the fact that the vast majority of heart cases
are at least partially caused by a preexisting condition. Even though
the statute20 provides that compensation will be limited to the proportionate amount of job-caused acceleration or aggravation of the
heart condition, such a proportion is extremely difficult to establish
(see Medical Appendix, infra). The imposition of the "unusual
exertion" test is, therefore, a practical consideration based on a fear
that the heart cases will get out of control unless some kind of arbitrary boundary is set.
At the same time, however, the practical application of the test is
extremely difficult when considered from the medical viewpoint. The
problem of ordinary everyday effort or work and its effect on the
heart is extremely difficult for many physicians to understand. It is
virtually impossible to determine when ordinary effort becomes a
strain. Medical criteria can be used only as a guide. Each instance is
different; what strains one individual may be only light work for
another. Each occurrence can be categorized only by a detailed analysis of the situation preceding and following the traumatic event.21
DELAYED REACTION CASES

The cases discussed in the preceding section all involved instances
in which the heart attack occurred at work. The critical determinations facing the court in attempting to establish causation in those
cases involved construing the statutory definition of "accident" and
the judicial requirement that there could be no compensation without a showing of "unusual exertion." In cases that involve an admitted accident, but damage to the heart is delayed for a substantial
period of time, the problem of establishing causation becomes even
more complex. Inasmuch as the statute2 2 requires that the heart condition be accelerated or aggravated by the work-connected injury,
and the heart condition does not appear until some time after the
injury, highly technical and often speculative (see Medical Appendix,
infra) medical evidence is a necessity. In those cases there is no question that the claimant has suffered an injury, rather the question
becomes, is the heart condition causally related to that injury? In
such a situation, of course, there is no requirement that there be

20.

21.
22.

FLA. STAT. §440.02 (19) (1963).
5 LAwyERs' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA §34.43 (1960).
FLA. STAT. §440.02 (19) (1963).
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"unusual exertion" because the problem is no longer whether exertion was a causal factor. The problem in these cases remains one of
causation, however utilization of the "competent substantial evidence" rule has been found necessary when a review of the deputy
commissioner's findings is required.
The Competent Substantial Evidence Rule
In attempting to reconcile the necessary medical testimony with
legal causation criteria, the courts have utilized the "competent substantial evidence" rule. The Florida courts have adopted the "competent substantial evidence" rule for use in appellate proceedings in
workmen's compensation cases. This rule was first set forth in United
States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.23 where it was held that
the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder
if there is competent, substantial evidence that sustains the fact
finder. "Substantial evidence" was described in De Groot v. Sheffield,24
-as such evidence as will establish a substantial basis of fact from
which the fact at issue can be reasonably inferred. .

.

. [it is] such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." 2s There is a presumption in favor of the
deputy commissioner's findings because he heard the witnesses and
saw the evidence; consequently neither the court nor the full commission may upset the deputy's findings if such are supported by
competent substantial evidence. This restriction on the full commission's power to set aside the finding of a hearing officer is an anomaly in the field of administrative law. Normally, an agency has full
authority to make all initial findings, even when the evidence is taken
2
before a hearing officer. r

This rule is most frequently invoked to uphold the claimant's
award. This is so because of the general policy of workmen's compensation to aid the injured worker and spread the burden of compensating the injured to the consuming public.
Causal Relation
Under the basic philosophy of workmen's compensation, employers
are required only to pay for injuries causally related to employment.
If the work effort in fact accelerates the heart attack, and if there is
more than mere speculation or possibility of this, the argument that
23. 55 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1951).
24. 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957).
25. Id. at 916.
26. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 §8 (a) (1946): "On appeal from
or review of the initial decisions of . . . [hearing] officers the agency shall . ..
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the same injury might have occurred while claimant was at his home
is no defense. The employers contend that the peculiar nature of
heart cases makes it possible that industry is footing the bill for
injuries that are actually nonwork connected. The workmen's compensation acts, however, initially place the burden on the claimant
to overcome the standard defense that the occurrence of the heart
attack at work was sheer coincidence,27 thus both the interests of the
employer and employee are taken into account.
There is a frequent interplay between the causal relation requirement and the substantial evidence rule. A series of cases beginning
with Kashin v. Food Fair, Inc. 28 illustrate this point. The claimant,
Kashin, cut off five fingers while operating a skill saw in the course
of employment. Kashin claimed that there was an extreme loss of
blood. Two-and-one-half years after the injury the claimant complained of heart trouble allegedly caused by this injury in the course
of his employment. At the hearing, a doctor, not knowing in fact
how much blood was lost, stated that if the claimant was correct as
to the extreme loss of blood, then the injury "could" have caused his
heart to be weakened. The deputy commissioner allowed recovery
for full disability on the ground that the physician was certain the
claimant's cardiac condition was a result of the accident.
The full commission reversed the deputy commissioner on the
grounds that his findings were not supported by competent substantial evidence in that he had misconstrued the legal significance of
the evidence adduced. The commission noted that the doctor's
declaration that there "could be" a causal connection was made with
no knowledge of the amount of blood the claimant actually lost. In
addition, three doctors were of the opinion that the claimant's heart
condition and the accident were in no way causally connected. The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the full commission by holding that
the doctors' conclusions were nebulous, speculative, and grounded on
assumed factual conditions. At best the statements rested on probabilities, not the requisite reasonable certainties and the weight of
the evidence was further reduced because of the conflicting medical
testimony. Thus, there was no competent substantial testimony to
show causation.
A case frequently cited in this area is Arkin Construction Co. v.
Simpkin. 29 The deceased employee fell five feet onto a concrete
have all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision." See also

Davis,

ADMiNITRATIvE

LAW

§10.04, n.182 (1959): "The agency may substitute

judgment for that of the examiner on any and all questions."
27. Heart Attacks- Causal Relation, 29 NACCA L.J. 223 (1958).
28. 2 FCR 381, aff'd, 97 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1957).
29. 99 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1957).
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floor when a scaffold collapsed. He suffered no apparent injuries and
worked the balance of the day. The next day he went to the company
doctor, played pool, ate dinner, and went to bed about 11:00 p.m.
He died that night about 3:30 a.m. An autopsy disclosed that death
was caused by myocardial failure due to fibrosis and coronary arteriosclerosis with insufficiency.30 The death certificate listed the immediate
cause of death as general visceral congestion. 31 The doctor who examined the employee said he had no history or symptoms of heart
trouble. A coemployee testified that Simpkins showed no evidence of
shortness of breath or stomach pain and that he had carried his full
share of the work. Other testimony showed that claimant had not
complained of chest pains. The medical specialist for the claimant
testified that "in all probability" the fall and resulting pain and
tension precipitated the occurrence of the heart attack. He stated
that the accumulated effect of pain over the forty-eight hour period
caused Simpkins to be tired and fatigued. The medical specialist for
the employer did not believe there was a causal connection between
the fall and the heart attack that occurred two days later. He felt
that if the shock from the fall caused the failure, the symptoms of
distress and shortness of breath would have appeared more promptly.
The deputy commissioner awarded compensation, finding a causal
connection. The full commission affirmed under the substantial evidence rule.32 The supreme court reversed, stating emphatically that

the burden of proving causal connection is upon the claimant and
that there must be evidence showing reasonable probability and
not mere speculation. To remove the proof from the area of speculation there must also be competent substantial evidence to show a
triggering of the attack. Such evidence did not exist in this case.
In Waters & Giebeig Construction Co.33 the heart claim was compensable even though the doctor testified only that it was possible
the heavy work in the sun had caused the spasm that precipitated
the attack. The evidence was substantial and not speculative primarily because of the lack of conflicting testimony and the medical
history of no previous heart conditions. In Sosenko v. American Airmotive Corp.34 the petitioner had fractured his ankle when a scaf-

fold collapsed beneath him. The claimant was compensated for
temporary total disability. After weeks of worry about his condition
30. Arteriosclerosis of the coronary arteries with the heart unable to perform
the function of adequately pumping the blood.
31. An abnormal accumulation of blood in one of the great cavities, that is,
the abdomen.

32. 2 FCR 268 (1957).
33. 3 FCR 307 (1958).
34. 156 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1963).
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and lack of ability to work, claimant, while still recuperating, suffered
a myocardia ischemia and posterior wall infarct. Two doctors testified that the fractured ankle with the resultant confinement and inactivity of the claimant, together -with the state, of anxiety tension
and state of worry, was a competent, accelerating, precipitating or
aggravating cause of the coronary occlusion. The full commission
reversed the deputy commissioner's finding of a compensable heart
condition. The supreme court reinstated the deputy's conclusion that
there was substantial competent evidence that the fracture "was a
competent, accelerating or precipitating cause" of the heart attack.
The court felt that the Victor Wine35 case did not necessarily answer
whether an injury subsequent, but related, to a primary compensable
injury was also compensable. The Victor Wine rule was adopted on
the basis of facts involving a claim of compensation for the primary
injury, in short, whether the injury was compensable under the act
in the first instance. The court adopted the following rule in situations involving subsequent injuries and their relation to the com36
pensable primary injury:
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original injury [or a new and distinct injury], is
compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury. But if the subsequent injury is attributable to claimant's own negligence or fault, the chain
of causation is broken, even if the primary injury may have
contributed in part to the occurrence of the subsequent injury.
HEAT ExHAusTIoN CASES

The courts and the commission have had difficulty with the cases
in which a heart attack is the effect triggered by "heat exhaustion."
In short, the issue is again one of causation in a peculiar factual pattern and, unless the heat exhaustion triggers the coronary condition,
the chain of causation, necessary for recovery under the act, is broken.
The "heat exhaustion" recoveries are complicated by the "expo3
sure doctrine." Alexander Orr, Jr.,Inc. v. FloridaIndustrialComm'n 7
established the rule of recovery for heat exhaustion; if it is necessary
in the course of employment for the employee to become exposed to
a danger materially in excess of that to which persons performing
similar services are exposed, and if this excessive exposure is the direct
cause of the injury, then the injury is compensable.
35. Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1961).
36. Sosenko v. American Airmotive Corp., 156 So. 2d 489, 492 (Fla. 1963),
citing 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSAnON §13.11 (1964).
57. 129 Fla. 869, 176 So. 172 (1937).
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In Minute Maid Corp. v. Florida Industrial Comm'n 38 the court
applied the "exposure" and "triggering" doctrines to a heart injury
and death case. The decedent had been engaged in loading scrap
lumber onto a truck under temperatures that ranged from seventynine to eighty-seven degrees; feeling weak he went to the aid room
and vomited. He did not complain of chest pains. He was taken to
the hospital later in the morning and there he complained of chest
pains. The diagnosis was heat exhaustion, possible coronary thrombosis, and beginning cardiac failure. The employee died that afternoon. The deputy commissioner allowed recovery because heat exhaustion was an unusual result (accident) of lumber loading, and
this heat exhaustion triggered the coronary thrombosis that caused
the death.
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that there
was insufficient evidence to support the finding that such heat exhaustion "triggered" the coronary thrombosis. The court felt that
the doctor had speculated as to the cause of death in that he did not
know which came first - the heart attack or the heat exhaustion.
Further, there had been no showing of abnormal duties (that is,
excessive exposure) that could have caused the heat exhaustion in
such a way as to make it compensable.
Covel v. Burgess 39 is a similar case. Deceased became overheated
while unloading a railroad gondola car and decided to rest. On swinging down from the car he felt a pain in his chest. He returned to work,
again became overheated, complained of chest pains, and was taken
to the hospital. His condition was diagnosed as a typical attack of
coronary thrombosis with infarction. He died three days later, the
immediate cause being a pulmonary embolus (a blood clot obstructing
circulation to the lungs). A physician testified that heat exhaustion
could trigger a coronary, however, he was not sure that the decedent's
immediate overheated condition was the basic cause of the attack.
The deputy found that overheating precipitated the coronary thrombosis and that death was causally related to the original coronary.
The reader should note that the medical testimony appears, at best,
to be speculative and conjectural.
The First District Court of Appeal reversed and dismissed the
action. It held that if heart failure is the immediate cause of death
there must be some substantial evidence that tends to show, not with
certainty but with reasonable probability, that the accident occurring
in the course of employment either caused or set in motion other
conditions that caused the heart failure.

38. 104 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1958).
39. 115 So. 2d 177 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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The case exemplifies the fear that the court has of compensating a
a heart condition that could easily have occurred under normal circumstances. The heart attack here was certainly an unusual result,
however, more must be shown to indicate that the attack was work
related. Hence the need for work-produced heat exhaustion that will
trigger the fatal attack. The reader should note also that the classic
fact pattern for heat exhaustion recovery was absent in Covell. Decedent appeared to have been subjected to no exposure excessive and
abnormal to his particular type of work. Thus, the requirement of
excessive and abnormal exposure appears to take the place of "unusual exertion" in the heat exhaustion cases.
SCOPE OF EmPLOYMENT

If a claimant was acting outside the scope of employment and this
activity was the apparent medical cause of the heart attack, claimant
is precluded from recovering under the compensation act.40 In Heath
v. Thomas Lumber Co.41 deceased had been a laborer and had
suffered coronary occlusion followed by a cardiac infarction. When
he returned to work he was given light duties only, such as checking
truck loads and so forth. There was evidence that he had been instructed by both the employer and his physician to do no manual
tasks. The apparent precipitating cause of the fatal attack was the
relatively light work of preparing an orange tree, the gift of his employer, for removal. The employer specifically instructed the decedent
not to remove the tree, but to let a coemployee do it. The commission
and supreme court avoided the causation questions of "unusual exertion" and "accident" (that is, unusual result) by finding that decedent had been acting outside the scope of his employment on a
purely personal mission in violation of express instructions by doctor
and employer against heavy manual work. Compensation was denied.
There was simply no aggravation of a preexisting condition or accident occurring during the course of decedent's employment. It should
be noted that the employee was considered to be outside the scope of
his employment merely because he had been requested not to do the
acts, not because he was actually violating the terms of his employment. The compensation act precludes the defendant from using
his common law defenses,42 hence contributory negligence is not
available to the employer. The decedent appeared to be acting negligently here (no reasonable man, in the face of specific instructions

40.

FLA. STAT. §440.02 (6) (1963).

41.
42.

140 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1962).
FLA. STAT. §440.11 (1963).
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to the contrary, would engage in physical exertions), but the court
could not use this as a rationale. Instead, it achieved the same result
through utilization of the scope of employment doctrine.
EMOTIONAL STRESS CAUSING HEART ATTACKS

A final area requiring discussion is that of the heart attack due
to emotional stress. In 1960, the commission was forced to deal with
this problem in Harbor Island Spa v. Barlow.43 This novel case
evolved from facts that, by their very nature, would rarely be the
foundation of any case law. Claimant was employed by the Spa
Health Resort to prepare special diets required by the patrons. He
was on duty fifteen hours a day and prepared all three meals. During the several months prior to claimant's coronary, he had engaged
in many heated arguments with the manager and on the day of his
attack he had several bitter arguments with the manager. Claimant
became emotionally upset and one-half hour later began to feel a
severe pain in his chest. He was hospitalized and the condition was
diagnosed as an acute coronary thrombosis. The physician testified
that there was a causal relation between the emotional strain and
the heart attack because the conduct of the manager over a period
of several months had caused claimant to become extremely nervous
and agitated. The deputy commissioner allowed recovery, stating
that the claimant's acute heart attack was caused by the emotional
stress of the employment. The full commission affirmed on the basis
of the substantial evidence rule. This case apparently was not appealed, though possible legal rationales are no difficulty. The emotional strain and stress was part of Barlow's working condition created
by his employer. This strain involved emotional exertion in excess
of that normally incident to the ordinary work of the employee. The
heart attack was an unexpected or unusual result from such overexertion in the course of employment. This rationale was, in essence,
adopted in Hampton v. Owen-Illinois Glass Co., 44 the only Florida
case dealing with the subject.45
Is THE HEART REALLY DIFFERENT?

Some believe that the workman's heart should be treated differently
from his leg or arm, when compensability is involved. The layman
simplifies the complex with the observation that arm injuries are
43. Florida Industrial Commission, Workmen's Compensation Division, Decision No. 2-977 (1960).
44. 140 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
45. For a further discussion of how heart attacks, induced by mental stress,
are handled in other jurisdictions see 15 Ar. L. REv. 844 (1962).
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seldom fatal and rarely weaken the over-all effectiveness of the body,
but heart injuries are frequently fatal and assuredly affect the over-all
operation of the body. Therefore, the injuries must be two different
types calling for different treatment. Physicians, however, argue that
as a matter of common sense and medical theory, no line can be drawn
between internal blockages and breakages and other injuries that are
generalized.46
The above observations are applicable in a general way to the
compensability of a workingman's injuries. Most courts compensate,
without dispute, a work-produced visible breaking or structural defect, for example, a broken leg. The judicial attitude toward coronary
thrombosis, is quite different, however, as the reader has observed in
the previous sections. This type of heart injury is very common and
results from a sudden and mechanical plugging-up action of a blood
clot, which produces an observable structural change. In order to
obtain compensation for this alteration of body structure, the claimant has to transverse a maze of doctrinal requirements. Only when
death is due to heart stoppage or fibrillation rather than thrombosis,
does a distinction have direct medical validity. In such cases, a post
mortem may show no structural change.47 As to the great majority
of heart failure cases, a treatment different than that afforded other
injuries may seem to be arbitrary and artificial. The same statutory
formula governs both classes of accident (an "unexpected event or
result"), the difference in treatment lies in the administrative and
judicial attitudes. Many believe that liability should be the same
whether a heart condition or a leg condition is involved. The fact
remains, however, that heart injuries are not similar to other injuries.
A post mortem is the exception, rather than the rule, and often it is
impossible to obtain permission to perform one. Heart disease is
cumulative in the great majority of cases, and an attack cannot be
attributed to any instance or situation, while other internal failures
can often be directly traced to a single trauma. Until medical science
becomes more precise, or until society requires that the workingman
should be provided with a plan of complete insurance in this area,
a legal distinction will have to be made. Such a distinction could be
applied with more precision, however, if problems in medico-legal
communication could be surmounted.
Problemsof Medico-Legal Communication
It is readily apparent from reviewing the findings of deputy commissioners and medical evidence presented to compensation boards
46.
47.

1 LARSON,
Ibid.
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and trial courts that many attorneys know very little about the medical
terminology and medical aspects of the cases they plead. They seem
to lack knowledge of heart disease and its cause; of symptoms and
results. Consequently, they are unable to discuss the causal relationship that may or may not exist. Many physicians add to the confusion because they are unable to distinguish between medical "possibility" and medical "probability. ' ' 48 In Florida, as well as in many
other jurisdictions, a mere "possibility" is not alone sufficient to
support a finding of fact in the medical doctor's testimony. 49 On the
other hand, if the medical witness is cognizant of the legal significance
attached to the word "probable" as distinguished from the term
"possible," very often it would be just a matter of word change, and
he could reasonably testify that the injury is a "probable" result of
a particular accident. 50
From the answers to questionnaires sent to doctors by insurance
analysts, and from testimony in court, the inescapable conclusion is
that there has been a considerable degree of loose medical testimony
in cases involving heart damage. In view of the presumption that the
contents of medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence on
behalf of claimant constitute prima facie evidence of the truth of
their contents, it is needless to expound upon the need for professional integrity and exactitude from the medical witness. 51
Although compensation formula is the same for a leg injury as
for a heart injury, there is a profound difference in the character of
the available medical testimony regarding the two injuries. Testimony
in heart cases is based fundamentally, not on observation, but on
postulation. 52 Medical experts can ordinarily tell what happened to
a leg and why, but without a post mortem they can only surmise what
happened to the heart and, given a post mortem examination, can
then only speculate as to why it happened. Given the conjectural
nature of the testimony who is to say that the empirical guess of the
layman may not eventually prove nearer the truth than the scientific
guess of the expert. 53 Any expert in the field of cardiology, who
testifies in accordance with his beliefs, is honest and entitled to respectful consideration. Nevertheless, these experts frequently express
48.
(Polsky
49.
50.

Moritz, Trauma and Heart Disease, in THE MEDICO-LEGAL READER 119
ed. 1956).
Arkin Constr. Co. v. Simpkins, 99 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1957).
Jones, Cardiac Victims and Workmen's Compensation, 49 Ky. L.J. 394, 401

(1961).
51. Evans, The Responsibility and Liability of the Employer in Industrial
Heart Disease Problems, 475 INS. L.J. 487, 493 (1962).
52. Levitan, The Liability Phase of the Cardiac Problem, 41 MARQ. L. REv.
347, 352 (1958).
53. Ibid.
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diverse conclusions as to the same injury. This difference is not in
veracity, but in hypothesis. Since no one has the omniscience to determine who is telling the truth when the truth is unascertainable, the
judge and jury do not select on the basis of credibility, but rather on
the basis of testimony that most nearly accords with their so-called
common-sense medical views.54
It has been pointed out in some of the Florida cases that the fact
finder or judge is most impressed, not by the truth of the medical
testimony, but by the strength of the doctor's faith in the correctness
of his own opinion. If two experts are in disagreement, but one has
a strong conviction and the other a mere medical view, the fact finder
will usually rely on the doctor of convictions. The result of this
medico-legal difficulty in communication is that the fact finder remains
perplexed and unenlightened by an unintelligible medical answer,
which was in reply to an unintelligible, to the physician, query by a
legal practitioner.
CONCLUSION

Given the liberal construction of the term "accident" and the
legislative "unusual result" amendment, it is conceivable that the
present workmen's compensation law could easily be converted into
a general health insurance program. The supreme court continually
denies that such a program exists in Florida, but the very mention
of the thought betrays the presence of such in the minds of the justices.
General health and accident insurance might be very appropriate for
the working man, but such a drastic change should be made by the
legislature. The claimant today must prove a causal connection between the work and the injury. The question is whether the employment did, in fact, cause or contribute to the injury. Each time an
employer is ordered to pay compensation in the absence of authentic
causal relationship between employment and accident, the original
theory of workmen's compensation dies a little. 55
A proposed alteration in the Kentucky workmen's compensation
structure is worthy of consideration. The idea is to amend the theory
of causation so that the evidence introduced at the hearing need only
indicate that the employment did "in fact" cause the unexpected result for which compensation is sought. In short, the "unusual exertion" test would be abandoned. 56 There would no longer be a
differentiation between exertion and overexertion. Although the "in

54. Id. at 352.
55.

Ibid.

56. Jones, supra note 50, at 404.
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fact" test is certainly a liberal approach, there still exists an expanse
of ambiguity and a free range on which the fact finder and court may
roam.
The Florida administrative and judicial bodies are aware of the
death statistics on cardiac involvements. One of every three people
comprising the general populace and one of every two industrial
workers suffer or claim to suffer some heart ailment. Because of this,
the courts have frequently been strict in the application of the act.
There is a realization that in view of the ever-increasing number of
cardiac problems of one kind or another, the full burden cannot be
placed on industry. Gross inequity, at least from industry's point of
view, could exist due to such words as "aggravation" and "acceleration" if they were given the most liberal interpretation. Consequently,
the courts and boards have balanced these equities. This balance
may be struck not in spite of, but because the legislature in fact did
leave the overly-ambiguous terms in the act. It is because of this latitude that the courts may freely judge and reach sound decisions viewed
from the present socio-economic circumstances.

MEDICAL APPENDIX
The only circumstance in which mechanical violence, that is, trauma, can be
said to be the direct cause of cardiac injury or disease is when the heart has been
wounded by an object that has penetrated the body, or has been bruised, or
crushed by a violent impact against the body. In such circumstances there is
rarely any doubt as to the causal relationship between the injury and the ensuing
heart failure. Unless the injury has caused immediate heart failure or immediate
and continuous impairment of cardiac function, it is usually assumed that no direct
damage to the heart was sustained. In the past, the possibility of cardiac trauma
from non-penetrating injury to the chest was ignored by the medical profession.
The stereotyped opinion was that the heart was an organ that almost always escaped
injury. Although the heart is well protected by the bony thoracic cage, there is
abundant evidence that cardiac injury does result from either direct or indirect
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violence many times without external evidence of injury and often from what
appears to be only slight trauma.' At the present time, more cases of traumatic
heart disease are overlooked than are diagnosed incorrectly.2
Many medical authorities believe that, even with the most severe exertion, it is
impossible to cause a normal heart to fail or dilate.3 Thus, if there is disability
or death from heart disease following exertion, there probably was a previous
abnormal heart condition. Therefore, to claim a causal connection the party
would need to show trauma plus immediate signs and symbols of the heart condition. Nevertheless, the cause-and-effect relationship would still remain a matter
of speculation unless established by a post mortem examination. Thus, any
compensation award would be apportioned according to the proximate contribution
of the preexisting disease and the acddent.4
Injuries to any part of the body may, and frequently do, result in extra work
for the heart. Such a sudden increase in work may cause a diseased heart to fail.
An episode of violent exertion, fear, pain, anger, or anxiety may greatly increase
the work of the heart independent of any trauma.5 Exertion, injury, or emotional
disturbance may cause the heart to beat more rapidly than usual, which obviously
places more work and stress on the heart. The rise in blood pressure due to
exertion or stress is another factor. The cause of the increased blood pressure
is a generalized reflex spasm of small blood vessels that narrow the passageway
through them, thus increasing the resistance to blood flow.6 This factor alone
may double the workload of the heart. Such an increase in physical work is
usually of brief duration and does not damage a normal heart. It does not
cause coronary thrombosis, persistently high blood pressure, persistently rapid
pulse, nor does it cause disease of a normal heart. It may, however, precipitate
the failure of an already diseased heart.7
Three types of heart diseases account for a large majority of heart conditions
and deaths. They are rheumatic, arteriosclerotic, and hypertensive heart disease.
Rheumatic fever causing heart disease is due to the pericardiums becoming
inflamed and the two layers sticking together and forming adhesions that may
seriously cripple the heart's actions. Thus, the heart muscle is left with
permanent lesions that may weaken the heart to the day of death. Once the
heart is diseased the scar tissue is never as strong as the original tissue.9
Arteriosclerotic type heart disease is also referred to as angina pectoris, coronary
thrombosis, or coronary artery occlusion. This is a gradual closure due to a
narrowing of the lumen of the artery by atheromalo leading to slow atrophy"
and death of the specialized cells of the part and then replacement by scar tissue.

1. Jones, Cardiac Victims and Workmen's Compensation, 49 Ky. L.J. 394, 403
(1961).
2. Kissane, Injury and Heart Disease-Legal Aspects, 15 OHIo L.J. 409 (1954).
3. Jones, supra note I, at 403.
4. Hampton v. Owen-Illinois Glass Co., 140 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1962).
5. Moritz, Trauma and Heart Disease, in THE MEDIco-LEGAL READR 119
(Posky ed. 1956).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Membrane sac composed of two layers that contain the heart muscle.

9. BoYD,

AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL SCIENCE

117 (4th ed. 1958).

10. A sebaceous cyst, that is, a greasy lubricating substance.
11. A defect or failure of nutrition manifested as a wasting away or diminution
in the size of the cell.
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A sudden closure by embolismi - or thrombosisa3 may cause formation of an infarct, an area in which all the tissue is killed by the sudden ischemia.14 The
scarring of the heart muscle caused by the cutting off of the blood supply leads
to great weakening of the heart's action.15 Frequently thrombosis is added to
atheroma, the thrombosis closing the already narrowed vessel. An infarct may
be produced, which in time bulges outward and finally ruptures, causing sudden
death.16
Although the public speaks of a "coronary attack"; from the standpoint of the
patient the essential feature is the presence or absence of an infarct. Basically,
arteriosclerosis is primarily a disease of the coronary arteries with the heart
muscle being damaged as a result of the arterial lesions. An infarct, however,
may occur without thrombosis, the lumen of the coronary artery being greatly
narrowed by atheroma,17 thickening of the innercoat.1s Thrombosis may occur
without the production of an infarct because the area of cardiac muscle is supplied from one of the other coronary arteries. It is the infarct of the heart
muscle, not the thrombosis of the coronary artery, that produces the symptoms
and distress from which the patient suffers. The infarct is a soft, yellow area of
dead muscle in the wall of the muscle. The softness of the dead tissue makes it
a weak spot that may rupture during the first week of the attack, or at a later
date thus causing sudden death.19
When the blood supply to a muscle is suddenly cut off very severe pain will
be experienced if the muscle continues to be used. In the case of the heart complete rest is impossible and the result is the agonizing pain known as angina
pectoris. This leaves the victim with a sense of suffocation as if the chest were
held in a vice. The sudden pain is felt in the region of the heart and frequently
passes down the left arm. It may, however, be felt in the epigastrium, the upper
part of the abdomen, and when not too severe is often mistaken for acute
indigestion.
The outlook in coronary artery occlusion varies greatly, depending on the size
of the artery that is blocked, the extent of the damage to the heart muscle, and
the question of collateral circulation. The patient may die instantaneously, however, if the heart survives the shock the neighboring arteries pour blood into the
ischemic area and a collateral circulation is established in time. When this
occurs the patient may make a reasonably satisfactory recovery but the heart will
be permanently crippled and the patient's future life must be adjusted with this
fundamental fact in mind.20
In angina pectoris the patient should be advised to live within his exercise
tolerance, that is, he should do no more activity than he can perform without
production of anginal pain.

12. Sudden blocking of an artery or vein by a clot or obstruction that has
been brought to its place by the blood current.
13. A clot more or less completely occluding a blood vessel or forming in
one of the heart cavities.
14. A deficiency of blood due to contraction of blood vessels.
15. BOYD, supra note 9, at 119.
16. Ibid.
17. An abnormal union of surfaces normally separated by the formation of
new fibrous tissue resulting from an inflamatory process.
18. BOYD, supra note 9, at 119.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss4/3

20

Wigginton: The Heart of the Working Man--A Post Mortem
1965]

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN HEART CASES

Neither trauma nor exertion cause coronary thrombosis although either
may cause the failure of a heart already handicapped by the presence of coronary
arteriosclerosis or thrombosis.21
Although any unusual stress may cause an arteriosclerotic heart to fail, heart
failure due to coronary disease usually occurs spontaneously and independently of
any known episode of external stress. If the failure of a chronically diseased heart
is to be attributed to an episode of stress, it should occur immediately thereafter.22
If hours or days elapse between the stress designated and the subsequent attack of
heart failure, the relationship between the two is probably nothing more than a
fortuitous sequential coincidence.23
The strain of the heart pump falls on the left ventricle. When the heart
fails, the ventricle becomes dilated and the reaction is like other forms of heart
4
failure. The condition is known as hypertensive heart disease.2 This is usually
a slowly progressive deterioration, and the course of the disease is rarely significantly affected by physical exertion or emotional disturbance.25 Frequently
hypertensive heart disease is complicated by coronary arteriosclerosis, and in that
event the heart has the same propensity to fail suddenly under stress as does
the heart of uncomplicated coronary arteriosclerosis.26 Many people live vigorous
lives with this disease and would be better off if they were ignorant of the fact
that they had high blood pressure.
The cause of hypertension27 is a mystery. The common form of high blood
pressure is called "essential hypertension." Recent work suggests that an imbalance
between hormones of the adrenal cortex and the kidney may be connected with
production of this mysterious condition.28 The small arteries of the body are
contracted with narrowing of their lumen, and this leads to increase of the
peripheral resistance to the blood flow so that the pressure in the large arteries
rises. The patient may not die of heart failure, but rather, death might result
from bursting of a blood vessel in the brain, that is, cerebral hemorrhage or
apoplexy.29

21. Moritz, supra note 5.
22. Id. at 125.
23. Powell v. American Employers Ins. Co., 14 So. 2d 333 (La. App. 1943).
24. BoYD, supra note 9, at 120-21.
25. Moritz, supra note 5, at 121.
26. Ibid.
27. Generally causes the heart to enlarge so as to be able to cope with the
increased amount of work.
28. Moritz, supra note 5, at 121,
29. Ibid.
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